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Foster v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 20, 111 P.3d 1083 (2005).1 
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEALS 
Summary 
Troy Anthony Foster, appellant, was charged with four counts of sexual assault and one 
count of kidnapping.  A jury found Foster guilty of three counts of sexual assault and acquitted 
him on one count of sexual assault and of kidnapping.  Foster appealed his conviction asserting 
five assignments of error.  The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Foster’s contentions concluding 
in part the evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. 
Foster then filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in district court, 
claiming ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel.  The district court appointed 
counsel to represent Foster and conducted an evidentiary hearing.  On January 28, 2004 the 
district court entered an order rejecting all of Foster’s claims and denying the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus.   
Foster again filed an appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court asserting a number of claims 
of error in the district court’s denial of Foster’s post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  Although Foster asserted a number of claims, the Nevada Supreme Court focused 
primarily on Foster’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was 
violated.  Foster claimed his counsel failed to assign any error on direct appeal with regard to the 
trial court’s finding that defense counsel violated Batson v. Kentucky.2 
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Foster’s post-
conviction habeas petition.  The court concluded Foster’s contentions that the district court erred 
in rejecting his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel were without merit.  
The court reasoned that Foster had failed to show the prejudice necessary to establish any 
entitlement to relief on any of his claims relating to his trial counsel’s failure to object to the trial 
court’s Batson decision and remedy or appellate counsel’s decision to assert any claims of error 
on appeal with the trial court’s remedy of the Batson issue.  The court further reviewed the 
remainder of Foster’s claims of error in connection with the denial of the post-conviction habeas 
corpus petition and thereto found that Foster failed to show the prejudice necessary to establish 
any entitlement to relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.  However, the court did 
reserve for a more appropriate case a more definitive decision of what remedy best serves to 
vindicate in Nevada courts the multiple interests that Batson protects.3 
                                                 
1  By Debra L. Pieruschka 
2  476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
3  The holding in Batson serves to protect three interests that are threatened by discriminatory jury selection:  (1) the 
defendant’s right to equal protection, (2) the excluded juror’s equal protection rights, and (3) the public’s confidence 
in the fairness of our system of justice.  Id. At 86-87. 
Issue and Disposition 
Issue 
Does a violation of Batson infringe upon a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
effective counsel when on direct appeal counsel fails to assign any error to the trial court’s 
remedy of reseating the juror who had been improperly peremptorily challenged? 
Disposition 
No.  The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision in rejecting 
Foster’s post-conviction habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because 
Foster failed to demonstrate prejudice sufficient to entitle relief.  Therefore, Foster’s Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel was not violated. 
Commentary 
State of the Law Prior to Foster 
In Nevada, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is subject to independent review.4  
Independent review is proper where the claim presents a mixed question of law and fact.5  A 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.6  The key for the 
court in evaluating “an ineffectiveness claim is whether the proper function of the adversarial 
process was so undermined by counsel’s conduct that the reviewing court cannot trust that the 
trial produced a just result.”7 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must meet the test 
established in Strickland v. Washington.8  In Strickland, the test starts with a strong presumption 
that counsel’s conduct falls within reasonable professional assistance.  The petitioner must show 
that counsels’ performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.9  However, if a petitioner fails to make a sufficient 
showing on either prong of the test, the court does not need to consider the remaining prong.10  
The habeas corpus petitioner must carry the burden of proving the disputed factual allegations 
underlying the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence.11   
The Strickland test applies to reviews of claims asserting ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.12  To establish prejudice based on deficient assistance of appellate counsel, the 
petitioner must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success 
                                                 
4  Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 622, 28 P.3d 498, 508 (2001). 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
7  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
8  Id. at 687. 
9  Id. 
10  Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102 (1996). 
11  Means v. State, 120 Nev. 101, _____, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). 
12  Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1113. 
on appeal.13  The Nevada Supreme Court has noted that appellate counsel need not raise every 
issue to provide effective assistance but is entitled to make tactical decisions to limit the scope of 
an appeal to issues the counsel determines have the highest probability of success.  As the 
Nevada Supreme Court has stated “a tactical decision . . . is ‘virtually unchallengeable absent 
extraordinary circumstances.’”14   
The petitioner must establish the counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  
Specifically, the petitioner must make a showing there is a reasonable probability that “but for 
counsels’ unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”15  A 
reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.16  
The assessment of counsel’s performance is reviewed under the circumstances and from 
counsel’s perspective at the time of action; not from hindsight.17 
The Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged it had not previously addressed the 
appropriate remedy for a Batson violation.  A Batson violation is one were counsel uses a 
peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race18 or gender.19  In determining 
whether peremptory challenges have been used in a discriminatory manner, the complaining 
party “must [first] make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination.”  Next the party 
accused of discriminatory challenges must offer a gender or race-neutral explanation for striking 
the jurors.  The trial court must then decide whether the complaining party has carried his burden 
of proving purposeful discrimination.  The Batson decision did not specify the appropriate 
remedy when a violation has been proven.20   
Other Jurisdictions 
The Nevada Supreme Court noted the Batson decision expressly left to the state courts 
how best to implement its holding.  State courts have generally used three approaches in 
implementing the Batson holding.21  Some jurisdictions mandate trial courts to disallow a 
peremptory strike made in violation of Batson or to reseat the improperly stricken juror.22  Other 
jurisdictions require the trial court to discharge the venire and commence a new jury selection 
from an entirely different venire.23  However, the majority of courts have delegated the 
determination of the appropriate remedy for a Batson violation to the discretion of the trial 
judge.24 
                                                 
13  Lara v. State, 120 Nev. 177, 183-84, 87 P.3d 528, 532 (2004) (citing Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1114). 
14  Doleman v. State, 112 Nev. 843, 848, 921 P.2d 278, 280-1 (1996). 
15  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
16  Id. 
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State, 115 Nev. 45, 975 P.2d 833 (1999). 
20  Walker v. State, 113 Nev. 853, 867, 944 P.2d 762, 771 (1997) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96). 
21  See Jones v. State, 683 A.2d 520, 525 (Md. 1996). 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
In the case at bar, the remedy the trial court exercised, reseating the challenged juror has 
been held to be an appropriate means of addressing a Batson violation.25  The Nevada Supreme 
Court found the trial court offered Foster’s counsel the choice of starting over with an entirely 
new venire or of continuing with the same venire with the last juror reinstated to the panel.  
Foster’s counsel made a strategic decision to continue with the same venire – all of which was 
done out of the presence of the venire.  Under the particular circumstances of this case, the 
reinstatement of the juror in question did not offend Foster’s rights under the United States 
Constitution. 
Effect of Foster on Current Law 
The Foster court concluded Foster failed to establish the prejudice necessary to entitle 
him to relief on his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assign error with 
respect to the trial court’s resolution of the Batson violation.  However, the court expressed its 
preference that the trial courts in the state should follow the American Bar Association Standard 
recommending that all peremptory challenges to the jury venire should be exercised outside the 
presence of the venire.26 
The court further expressed if the juror whom the peremptory challenge was exercised 
against is reseated and a curative instruction requested, the curative instruction should be given 
on the record for purposes of review. 
Unanswered Questions 
The court held Foster failed to prove the trial court erred by reseating the challenged juror 
as an appropriate remedy for a Batson violation.  However, the court declined to engage in a 
comprehensive analysis of the appropriate remedy for a Batson violation in the context of a post-
conviction appeal.  The court explicitly limited its holding in Foster and reserved for another 
more appropriate case a definitive decision on what remedy best serves the multiple interests 
Batson protects. 
Conclusion 
Although the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Foster’s post-
conviction petition of writ of habeas corpus, it limited the holding to those facts and 
circumstances of this case that reseating the challenged juror was an appropriate remedy.  The 
court left open the door for a future case to determine the appropriate remedy for a Batson 
violation.  
                                                 
25  See e.g., Jones, 683 A.2d 520 (concluding that reseating improperly challenged jurors was an appropriate remedy 
for a Batson violation committed by defense counsel). 
26  See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY 15-2.7(a) (3d ed. 1996). 
